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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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injustices. On August i6th, two days after signing the Military Agree-
ment, General Anders sent a report to the Polish C.-in-C., in London,
explaining the attitude of the Poles in Russia :
" I must admit that the Russian authorities are consistent, if slow.
To-day the order for the release of the Polish citizens was published. It
seems that it can only be us (we, above all people, who have passed through
the Gethsemane of ill-treatment in Soviet prisons, concentration camps and
compulsory exile) who can now in any way oppose the efforts towards
concord with Russia ! But all of us, without exception, are passing over
our own personal affairs now that this chance of fighting once more with
arms in our hands for Poland, for our country, is given to us. The path
towards our great aim is clearly indicated. This possibility of forming a
sovereign Polish Army and of creating along with it the centres of our
culture, where we can rescue at least a few hundred thousand Polish citizens,
our so precious population (the families of the soldiers, many orphans and
children, members of cultural organisations and so forth) from misery is
of intrinsic value."*
These were the sentiments of the Poles in Russia. But did the Kremlin
really intend carrying out the signed agreement with complete loyalty ?
And did the Kremlin believe that its c former foe * or rather its e former
victim * could be trusted ?
Both sides had to prove their good intentions and their good-will.
But since the Poles were indeed physically a very weak'partner in the
contract, it was to be expected that the Soviets would at least express some
form of chivalry towards the peoples of a country with whom they had
already broken previous agreements. It is worth noting that the Kremlin
leaders made it clear from the first that their conduct towards Poland had
always been perfectly * just * and adopted the attitude that, e they had
never invaded Poland/ that they * had not stabbed her in the back/ and
they ' had not deported her population/ emphasising this at every oppor-
tunity. Each action of the Soviets, so they declared had c strictly con-
formed to the existing treaties * and * had been carried out for state
reasons.3
The Soviets intended to exploit the Polish-Russian Agreement in three
ways. Firstly, they planned to send some of the Polish troops into the
front line; secondly, they wanted to use the Poles in an attempt to
organise a revolt in the rear of the attacking German armies; and
thirdly, to supply the Russian Intelligence Service with information
regarding the movements of the Germans in Poland.
The first objective was fairly straightforward, but the remaining two
were not entirely military in character. They also had an important
political aspect for, as a consequence, the forces of Underground Poland
would have been subordinated to the Russian High Command. All of
which went far beyond the bounds of the concluded Agreement, and, as it
soon became clear, were quite incompatible with both Polish sovereignty
and her national interests.
* Dzisnnik Pohki (Polish Daily), London, August 25th, 1941.
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